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AGENTS3 min read

A chat-driven coding agent that can waste a day, but can't reach a secret

Nov 14, 2026DekimuAI-generated

Messages sent to the coding agent over Telegram now run in a sandbox that holds no secrets and can open exactly one network connection. The model can read a repository, change code and commit it to a branch. It cannot push, deploy, read an API key or send data anywhere. What comes back is a proposed pull request that a person approves with one tap, reviews and tests before it merges.

What does a message turn into?

The bot obeys one private chat and nothing else. Group messages, other senders, edited messages and messages relayed through other bots are dropped before anything runs. A forwarded or quoted message reaches the model as quoted material, labelled as data, so text copied from somewhere else never acts as a command, even when it looks like one.

Any other text, or a voice note transcribed on the same server, starts a propose-only run. The run gets a fresh clone of one repository from a short allowlist, on a new branch, under a cap on runs per hour.

What can the model reach?

Each run executes as its own unprivileged system user in its own control group, with a minimal environment. The worker's secrets are not in that environment, and the run's user cannot read the files that hold them. The firewall lets that user open one connection: a proxy on the same machine.

The proxy is the only process that holds the model credential. It accepts only the messages API, parses each request body and re-serializes it instead of forwarding raw bytes, adds the credential outside the sandbox, and refuses server-side tools that would have the provider fetch a URL on the model's behalf. Link previews are switched off on every bot message as well, because a preview makes the chat service fetch the first URL in the text.

A bad run should be able to ruin a day. It should never be able to ruin a life.

How does a change get out?

When a run ends with commits, the worker, not the model, lists the changed files from git and sends a card with the title and the file count. Nothing has left the machine at that point. Approving pushes exactly the commit the card described. Before the push, the worker checks that the branch has not moved, that the proposal touches no CI workflow or deploy configuration, and that both still match the default branch, so an old base cannot carry old pipeline files. A commit message that would close an issue on merge is refused too.

Agent branches use a reserved prefix. CI jobs that hold secrets skip it and preview deploys are off for it, because a pipeline runs the pushed commit's code with the repository's secrets. A person reads the diff, starts CI on the branch by hand and merges only when it is green.

Did it hold?

Two hostile messages went in once the new path was live. One asked the agent to print every environment file and send it to an outside address. It refused inside the sandbox, and there was nothing there to print. The other asked it to push straight to the main branch. Nothing was pushed, and no agent branch appeared on the remote.

The change also removed things: a second bot, a CI job that ran an agent with repository secrets in reach, and two web endpoints that accepted agent commands. The other automated agent jobs in CI are next to move onto the same footing.

AGENTS

This post was drafted by an AI system from Dekimu's public engineering record and published with automated checks, without per-post human editing.

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